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possibly consistent with the principle of convenience. 5 In giving
effect to the first principle it has been uniformly held that where
there is a devise "to the children of A" and no life estate intervenes, the class closes at the testator's death and after-born children are precluded from taking under the will. 6 When, on the
other hand, a life estate intervenes, that is, "to A for life and then
to the children of B", the class is held to increase at least until the
death of the life tenant.7 Nevertheless, in the instant case, the court
construed the devise to the widow only as a testamentary confirmation of her dower rights, and then held the class closes at the
testator's death. While the doctrine favoring the early vesting of
estates should normally control, it is obvious that no inconvenience
would result here (at least as to the mansion house) where the
devise was "to A for life, and after her death to the children of
B". "Here the remainder vests at once in the children living at
the death of the testator, but will open and let in all children of
B born after that time, but before the death of A." 8 In other
words, the remainder to the children living at the testator's death
might have been regarded as vested, subject to partial divestment
by the birth of more children after the testator's death. Presumably this possibility was not sufficiently apparent in the disposition
of the present litigation.
L. R. M.
WILnS--UMTuAL WILLS OF HUSBAND

AND WIFE-INT

T OF

SuRvivOR.-H and W executed wills, each leaving all of his or her
estate to the other. H had typed both wills, and the provisions were
practically identical. They were signed by H and W and witnessed
by the same witnesses, at the same time, all in the presence of each
other. W died, and H probated her will. Fifteen months later H
died, and his will, leaving his estate to W, was offered for probate
by the illegitimate daughter of W. There was ample evidence that
H informally indicated an intent that his will continue in effect.
Heirs-at-law of H contested the probate, which was denied. The
lower court held that the testamentary intent was to make the
survivor the sole beneficiary, and that on the death of one of the
parties, the remaining will became inoperative. Held, that mere
SIMEs, LAw OF FUTURE INTERESTS (1936) § 378.
6 KAES,FUTURE INTERESTS IN ILLINOIS (1905) c. 10, § 226.
7 Id. at pp. 326-327; Hamletts v. Hamlett's Ex'r, 12 Leigh 350 (Va. 1841);
Cooper v. Hepburn, 15 Gratt. 551 (Va. 1860); Bently v. Ash, 59 W. Va. 641,
53 S. E. 636 (1906); Sleeper v. Killion, 182 Iowa 245, 164 N. W. 241 (1917).
8 Note (1899) 4 VA. L. REG. 624 (italics supplied).
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execution of mutual wills by husband and wife is not sufficient tb
establish a contract which will have the legal effect of making the
two wills a joint will, and thus render inoperative the will of the
survivor. In re Werkman's Will.1
Wills involving the testamentary disposition of two or more
persons may be classified as joint, reciprocal or mutual. In joint
wills, the same instrument is made the will of two or more persons
and is jointly signed by them.' It may be probated as the single
will of each maker and is revocable at any time by any of the
testators during their joint lives, or, after the death of any of them,
by the survivors.2-uch
confusion exists as to the use of the terms
';mutual" and "reciprocal" wills. Often they are used interchangeably, but again they are used to indicate two different types
of wills, that is, reciprocal wills contain similar provisions and
can be probated as the will of each,$ but while mutual wills also
contain similar provisions, they are generally based on a compact.
It is often claimed in the case of mutual wills that only the will of
the first to die is operative, it being the intent of the parties to vest
title to all the property in the survivor, the two wills in reality constituting but a single will, the will of the first to die. But again,
the compact may be so interpreted as to vest all of the property in
the heirs and distributees of the first to die-the will of the last
to die remaining operative so that on his death title to all the
property is vested in the heirs and distributees of the first to die.
In other eases, the compact may expressly provide that each one
shall leave his property to the other with the understanding that
the survivor shall devise and bequeath all to a designated third
4
party.
As to the right to revoke, this right is found to be absolute if
the wills are reciprocal ;5 if the wills are mutual, this right is qualified. If the one revoking is the first to die the will may be revoked,
for the survivor may still dispose of his property in furtherance
of his intent. However, if the first to die follows out the intent,
the questions arises whether or not the survivor is bound by the
113 S. E. (2d) 73 (W. Va. 1941). The evidence showed the great affection
held by Hf for the proponent, and the seeming lack of it for his heirs-at-law, the
contestants.
21 JARM .,
WmLs (6th ed. 1910) 41; 1 SOHOULER, WILLs, ExEouToRs &
ADmnisTR TORS (6th ed. 1923) § 716; Goddard, Mutual Wills (1919) 17
MIcH. L. REv. 677; Gerbrich v. Freitag, 213 Ill.
552, 73 N. E. 338 (1905).
8 Goddard, supra n. 2, at p. 682. Under lapse statutes the heirs of the first
to die could take.
41 SCHoULER, op. cit. supra n.2, at § 719; 28 R.C.L. § 122.
51 PAGE, Wiu.s (2d ed. 1928) § 88.
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agreement he has made. As a will, such an instrument is revocable
till death, but as a contract, it is enforceable." A trust may be
a
established as to the property in the hands of the survivor, and
7
new will made by the survivor may be declared inoperative.

If

it can clearly be shown that the two wills are to be in effect only
one will," or that the wills form a compact providing for each other,9
and possibly a third person, such agreement will be upheld. B~t
proof of such a compact must be clear and unequivocal. It requires
more than a mere making of "reciprocal" testamentary dispositions to convert a revocable instrument into an irrevocable compact. 10
The holding of WiTson v. Starbuck"l was that the will of the
survivor, while not revoked, was rendered inoperative by the prior
death of the other spouse. The real issue here, then, was whether
that decision constituted a more or less rigid rule of law, applicable
even as against the clear intent of the survivor that his instrument
ScrHOULER, op. cit. supra n. 2, at § 720.
7 Rastetter v. Hoenninger, 214 N. Y. 66, 108 N. E. 210 (1915) ; Underwood
v. Myer, 107 W. Va. 57, 146 S. E. 896 (1929).
8 Wilson v. Starbuck, 116 W. Va. 554, 182 S. E. 539 (1935).
0 Anderson v. Anderson, 181 Iowa 578, 164 N. W. 1042 (1917); Comment.
(1925) 24 MAfom L. REv. 85.
10 Canada v. Ihmsen, 33 Wyo. 439, 240 Pac. 927 (1925); Edson v. Parsons,
155 N. Y. 555, 50 N. E. 265 (1898) ; Flowers v. lowers, 32 Ohio App. 350, 166
N. E. 914 (1928) ; Wanger v. Mar, 257 Mo. 482, 165 S. W. 1027 (1914). See
Stevens v. Myers, 91 Ore. 114, 177 Pac. 37 (1918) where the court found evidence of a contract. But see the dissent in Maurer v. Johansson, 223 Iowa 1102,
274 N. W. 99 (1937). In Clement v. Jones, 166 Ga. 738, 144 S. E. 319 (1928)
X and D executed wills, each devising to the other all his or her estate, naming
each other as executor and executrix. The wills were drawn on the same day,
with the same witnesses present. The survivor threatened to make a new will,
and the plaintiffs, heirs-at-law of the deceased, sought a petition to restrain D
from so doing, and asked that a trust be imposed on the property. The petition
was denied. The court held that there was no evidence of "mutual wills" and
that if D wanted to change her will she was at liberty to do so.
11116 W. Va. 554, 102 S. E. 539 (1935). Both H and W had been previously
married and had had children by their former marriages. Shortly after their
marriage they executed wills which were almost identical. Each knew the provisions of the other's will. Neither will was offered for probate till after the
death of both. There was no particular evidence that the survivor desired his
will to remain operative. " ITo say it was intended that then the contract was
to bind the survivor by his own will to permit his estate to pass to the heirs-atlaw and distributees .of the first to die, to the exclusion of his own next of hIn,
(At page 560.) In the instant case
we think reached an unnatural result."
the court said: "We think it improbable, under the circumstances developed
by the record, that the testator intended that all of his estate, including that
derived from his wife under her will, should go to his kindred, and that the child
of his wife, for whom he had this deep affection, should be deprived of any
interest whatever in his estate and that of her mother. We think the probabilities strongly rest with the proposition that, with knowledge of the legal consequences of allowing his will to become operative at his death, he purposely refrained from revoking the same." (At page 78.)

a Ibid. 1
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should retain its former validity. Apart from the accepted doctrine that the testator's intent is the polestar of construction, it is
axiomatic that a canon of construction as a rule of presumed intent does not apply where there is actual evidence as to the
testator's wishes.12 Hence, Wilson v. Starbuck can hardly prevail
against the indicated desire of the testator that the operation of his
testamentary instrument continue.
A. A. A.
l

2

Hooper v. Woods, 97 W. Va. 1, 125 S. E. 350 (1924).
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